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ABSTRACT 
This paper proposes to integrate biometric-based key generation into an obfuscated interpretation algorithm to protect 
authentication application software from illegitimate use or reverse-engineering. This is especially necessary for 
mCommerce because application programmes on mobile devices, such as Smartphones and Tablet-PCs are typically 
open for misuse by hackers. Therefore, the scheme proposed in this paper ensures that a correct interpretation / execution 
of the obfuscated program code of the authentication application requires a valid biometric generated key of the actual 
person to be authenticated, in real-time. Without this key, the real semantics of the program cannot be understood by an 
attacker even if he/she gains access to this application code. Furthermore, the security provided by this scheme can be a 
vital aspect in protecting any application running on mobile devices that are increasingly used to perform 
business/financial or other security related applications, but are easily lost or stolen. The scheme starts by creating a 
personalised copy of any application based on the biometric key generated during an enrolment process with the 
authenticator as well as a nuance created at the time of communication between the client and the authenticator. The 
obfuscated code is then shipped to the client’s mobile devise and integrated with real-time biometric extracted data of the 
client to form the unlocking key during execution. The novelty of this scheme is achieved by the close binding of this 
application program to the biometric key of the client, thus making this application unusable for others. Trials and 
experimental results on biometric key generation, based on client's faces, and an implemented scheme prototype, based 
on the Android emulator, prove the concept and novelty of this proposed scheme. 
Keywords: Biometrics, Mobile applications, Obfuscated interpretation, Software protection 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Software anti-piracy protection techniques attempt to contain/limit the financial damage of software piracy or misuse of 
any kind. Software misuse is rapidly increasing every year and it was quoted to cost the industry some $51.4 billion in 
2009 [1]. One of the major concerns to software developing companies and software users in today’s highly mobile and 
connected world is the distribution of “cracked”, and the use of unlicensed software. On the other hand, mobile 
applications on Smartphones or Tablet-PCs, e.g. iPhone/Android based devices, are increasingly used to perform 
financial/business or security related transactions everywhere anytime. As these mobile devices are easily lost or stolen, 
the protection of data and applications on such devices against unauthorised access/use becomes even more important. 
Biometric-based (or data regarding one's identity, or something you are) authentication, knowledge-based (or data of 
something you know, e.g. a password) authentication and object-based (or data about something you have, e.g. a token) 
authentication have been used extensively in various remote communication to validate a client to an authenticator [2]. In 
contrast to object-based or knowledge-based authentication factors, in biometric-based authentication a legitimate client 
does not have to carry or remember anything to perform the authentication. However, biometric authentication, which is 
known to be more reliable than the other traditional authentication methods, requires only the physical presence of the 
client, which makes it a very convenient and simple to use for authentication. 
Current generations of personal computers, notebooks, Smartphones or Tablet-PCs feature a wide variety of sensors (e.g. 
camera, microphone or multi-touch displays) that can be easily employed to capture a client's biometrics. 
This paper proposes to use a biometric key, generated from fresh and real-time captured client biometric data, in 
conjunction with obfuscated interpretation to protect the "execution of a software application" on the client’s device. 
  
 
 
Without presenting the correct biometric key to the system, the obfuscated program will not run at all or will produce an 
incorrect authentication for any illegitimate client. 
A prototype of BossPro is implemented on an Android platform emulator. It is designed in such a way that it can handle 
both normal (unprotected) applications as well as obfuscated (protected) applications at the same time. Also, the 
proposed methods can be combined seamlessly and trouble-free with other software protection techniques, e.g. opaque 
predicates or lexical/control flow transformations as the instruction obfuscation is employed on the result of previous 
transformation steps. Additional software protection methods that increase the number of instructions can further 
enhance the security of the obfuscated interpretation. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the background and outlines related work of software 
protection techniques and biometric-based key generation. Section 3 introduces the general concept of the proposed 
biometric-secured obfuscated interpretation scheme. Section 4 describes the implementation of the prototype application 
based on the Android emulator and discusses the trial and experimental results. Finally, we conclude the paper and 
outline future work in Section 5. 
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
2.1 Software protection techniques 
Software protection can be broadly categorised into three main groups [3]: 1) Software watermarking, 2) Software 
tamper proofing or tamper resistance, and 3) Software obfuscation. Software watermarking adds visible or hidden 
information to source code to prevent software theft or to proof the original ownership, if a misuse of a piece of software 
has been discovered. To generate resilient, cheap and stealthy software watermarks various methods based on, for 
example, opaque predicates [4], register allocation [5] or self-validating branches [6] were proposed. Software tamper 
proofing or more precisely tamper resistance (as every protection mechanism can be bypassed with sufficient knowledge, 
time or resources) tries to prevent illegal modification or distribution of software. Examples of proposed tamper 
resistance techniques include self-modifying and self-decrypting Integrity Verification kernels (IVK) [7] or dynamic 
integrity checking [8]. Software obfuscation is similar to tamper resistance in that it also aims to protect the code against 
malicious modifications. However, in contrast to tamper resistance, software obfuscation [9] attempts to transform a 
piece of software into an equivalent program that has the same behaviour but is more difficult to reverse-engineer and 
therefore harder to manipulate by an attacker. 
Neither watermarking nor tamper resistance or obfuscation techniques alone can guarantee a fully protected software 
[10]. But even though one technique on its own can be easily broken [11], a combination of several methods can “raise 
the bar” substantially. This makes any attempt to fool such protection system uneconomical for the attacker. 
Monden has introduced a framework for obfuscated interpretation [12] where a hardware implemented finite state 
machine (FSM) was proposed. This ASM “retranslates” the instructions of an obfuscated program into the original ones 
during program execution/interpretation (Figure 1). The main security concept of obfuscation interpretation is that a 
program can be considered "secure" (in terms of reverse-engineering) if an attacker can not understand the real semantics 
of the program from the available code instructions, without having the state transition rules for the retranslation (reverse 
obfuscation). A major drawback of the framework proposed by Monden is that the change of the transition rules is very 
difficult in the hardware based implementation of the FSM during development and nearly impossible once the hardware 
unit is integrated into the end-user device. In addition, dummy instructions must be injected into the code to guarantee 
the correct interpretation by the FSM. However, dummy instructions could leak information about the real semantics of 
the program code and so make attacks possible. To overcome these problems, Zhang [13] proposed an obfuscated 
interpretation framework that uses a permutation-based interpreter (PMI) implemented in software. The PMI allows in 
their proposed framework an easy change of the transition rules and does not require any additional dummy instructions. 
Recently, Zeng [14] has developed a software watermarking scheme based on obfuscated interpretation.  
BossPro uses a protection scheme similar to [13], but uses biometric generated keys to (de-)obfuscate instructions during 
program development and execution/interpretation. This will tightly bind the obfuscated software to the legitimate client 
and shall remove the requirement to hide the interpreter from the program user (or a possible attacker) as well as the 
necessary encryption of the permutation rules described by Zhang. 
  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Concept of obfuscated interpretation as originally proposed in [12] 
 
2.2 Biometric key generation methods 
Biometric cryptosystems have been proposed to provide stronger security mechanisms by combining biometrics with 
cryptography. Biometric cryptosystems can be broadly categorised into three main approaches: (i) key release, (ii) key 
generation, and (iii) key binding. 
In the key release approach, the cryptographic key and the biometric data of a client are stored as two separate identities 
at different hosts where the key is released only when an authentication attempt of the client is successful. This method is 
straightforward and easy to implement but it has two major drawbacks [15]. The first drawback is due to the fact that 
biometric templates are not secure and that the "biometric matcher" can be overridden. The second drawback is due to 
the fact that cryptographic keys are not secure because they are not combined with biometric data when compared to the 
other two approaches. 
In the key generation approach, a cryptographic key is directly derived from the biometric data without storing it 
anywhere. Typically, biometric features in this approach are represented as a binary string and the robust bits are selected 
as a cryptographic key. It has been shown that such methods have high False Rejection Rates (FRRs) which them an 
impractical method [16]. 
Finally, in key binding approaches, the biometric template and the key are combined in a way that makes it 
computationally infeasible to retrieve the key without previous knowledge of client’s biometric data. The cryptographic 
key is randomly generated during the enrolment stage. Then it is discarded after combining it with the biometric data. At 
the authentication stage, the cryptographic key is released only if the query biometric sample is matched. It is known that 
biometric data are fuzzy due to intra-class variations resulting from the differences between the freshly captured 
biometric sample and the enrolled templates. On the other hand, cryptographic keys have to be precise and repeatable 
every time. Therefore, there is a need to employ error correction techniques such as Error Correcting Codes (ECC) to 
bridge the gap between the fuzziness of biometric and the preciseness of cryptographic keys. 
BossPro adopts the key binding approach for our implementation based on face biometric. Note that, throughout this 
paper "key binding" and "key generation" are used similarly. Figure 2 illustrates the process of biometric key binding. 
The cryptographic key is fed into an ECC encoder and then XORed with the binary representation of biometric data to 
produce a biometric lock or helper data. After that, the key is discarded and the biometric lock and the hash of the key 
are saved. The binary representation of the biometric data is calculated from extracted biometric features where a client-
based transformation such as random projection [17] can be employed to produce cancellable biometric followed by a 
biometric binarisation. At the authentication stage (key retrieval stage), the binary representation is calculated using a 
fresh biometric sample in the same way as described above and then XORed with the biometric lock. Then, an error 
correcting technique is used in the decoding mode to tolerate intra-class variation. The decoding is successful and the 
key released if the difference between the reference biometric sample(s) and the fresh biometric sample is within a 
certain predefined threshold. 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Biometric key binding process 
 
3. BIOMETRIC-SECURED OBFUSCATED INTERPRETATION 
The two base elements of the BossPro scheme are (1) the biometric key generation and (2) a standard software 
development cycle supplemented by an optional specification step that defines the application elements to be obfuscated 
(Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Application development and client enrolment 
 
During an enrolment process, biometric keys are generated from the freshly taken client biometrics (e.g. face) and stored 
for later use (application obfuscation) in a database together with additional client information (e.g. unique client 
identifier). To protect the sensitive client-specific biometric data, only cancellable / revocable biometric keys [18] are 
used and stored in the database. 
A possible usage scenario for BossPro is a remote authentication process between a client and a bank in a mCommerce 
transaction. For example, the bank wants to offer their services only to enrolled clients, who have been successfully 
verified to the bank at the moment of system use. Another application example is when any software developer or 
business company (e.g. bank) wants to distribute a new (or an updated version of) their biometric-secured software 
application to their enrolled clients. Then, a standard software development cycle (e.g. Java development for Android 
based mobile devices) is executed. If it is not possible or desired that the complete application is protected by obfuscated 
interpretation (e.g. when some parts may be used as libraries by other (not protected) applications), then an optional 
development step can specify the elements to be obfuscated. Otherwise the complete application code is obfuscated. If 
  
  
 
 
the software works as expected, the new (or updated) application is obfuscated using the biometric key. In this process, 
the original program instructions are substituted (obfuscated) with instructions selected on the basis of each client's 
stored biometric key making the resultant application program code uniquely tailored/dependent on each client. This 
individual biometrically-secured obfuscated application "code" is then distributed to its associated and enrolled client for 
installation on the client’s device, e.g. Smartphone. To enhance the authentication process, some transactions may 
encode a "nuance" generated at the communication/transaction time to secure the transmitted program code and so 
eliminate the replay attacks. 
Secure storage of the client’s cancellable biometric keys in the proposed scheme removes the necessity of re-enrolment 
of the client for each new (or updated) version of the application, which would be expensive, time-consuming and 
inefficient in scenarios with many applications and enrolled clients. 
Once a client wants to execute a possible protected application on the mobile device, for example for authentication 
purpose for a financial transaction, the proposed scheme shall start the application and check if this application is 
protected and so needs an obfuscation interpretation (Figure 4). As the general layout and the instructions of an 
obfuscated program are not distinguishable from an unprotected program during interpretation/execution, an additional 
label is inserted during the obfuscation process. If this label is present in the application, or in some parts of the 
application, then the scheme invokes a process, which generates a new biometric key from a freshly taken client 
biometrics (e.g. face), and passes this key to the application interpreter to perform the obfuscated interpretation. 
Otherwise, the application is executed normally by the interpreter. 
 
Figure 4. Application execution on client’s mobile device 
 
4. BOSSPRO IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS 
4.1 Prototype implementation 
To test this proposed biometric-secured obfuscated interpretation scheme, and to verify the practicality of this 
authentication, a prototype implementation, based on Android version 2.2 (Froyo), was developed. 
Android is a software stack initially invented by Android Inc. and since 2005 developed by Google Inc and the Open 
Handset Alliance [19]. The fact that the complete software stack, including the operating system, middleware and 
important applications are available to the development community as Open Source makes Android a perfect candidate 
for this prototype development. Furthermore, Android is the fastest growing operating system used in mobile devices 
with enhanced sensors and capabilities. Note that this implementation does require the use of Smartphones so to capture 
and process the biometric data. It is expected that Android will surplus all other mobile operating systems by 2014 [20]. 
The Android operating system is based on a modified Linux kernel. System and client applications are 
executed/interpreted by the Dalvik virtual machine (DVM) which is part of the Android runtime and located in the 
Android system architecture above the Linux kernel. The DVM is a register-based virtual machine which interprets 
Dalvik byte code instructions generated by the “dx” tool from compiled Java language sources, i.e. each application, 
when started on an Android device, is first loaded from an .apk-file which contains the generated Dalvik byte code 
instructions. This is then verified and optimised before being interpreted by the DVM (Figure 5). 
  
 
 
For our testing, to execute the biometric-secured obfuscated interpretation inside the DVM, the source code of the DVM 
was adapted; a new operating system image was compiled; and used with the Android emulator for testing this prototype 
implementation. 
 
 
Figure 5. DVM steps during application execution 
 
4.2 Byte code instructions for obfuscation 
In order for an application to pass the compilation, loading, verification and optimisation steps of the Android DVM, not 
all byte code instructions can be substituted during the obfuscation process. For example, it is not possible to replace the 
“return-void” instruction because this is the only DVM instruction without parameters. Similarly, “iget*”, “iput*”, 
“invoke-*” or “invoke-*/range” instructions (Table 1) cannot be obfuscated because these instructions are automatically 
replaced by the DVM optimiser with other instructions, and thus are not available to the interpreter for de-obfuscation. 
Finally, instructions can be only replaced with other instructions, if and only if they have the same general return type as 
well as the same number and type of parameters. All other substitutions would not pass the verification stage of the 
DVM. For example the “add-int” instruction can only be substituted with 16 byte code instructions, the “if-eqz” with 6 
instructions (Table 2). 
Obviously, the security of obfuscated interpretation increases by increasing number of instructions that can be used for 
substitution of byte code instructions. Table 3 shows the total number of instructions for six Android applications. The 
first four applications (Browser, Contacts, E-Mail and Phone) are standard system applications available on all Android 
mobile devices, while the remaining two applications (PayPal and FXCM Mobile TSII (MarketSimplified Inc)) are “top-
free in Finance” applications from the Android market. The total number of byte code instructions in the .apk-file of the 
application varies between 23.000 (Browser) and 100.000 (E-Mail) with around 60% of instructions that can be 
theoretically obfuscated. 
 
Table 1. Instructions replaced by DVM optimiser 
Instruction group Instruction Mnemonic 
iget* iget, iget-wide, iget-object, iget-boolean, iget-short, iget-byte, iget-char, iget-short 
iput* iput, iput-wide, iput-object, iput-boolean, iput-short, iput-byte, iput-char, iput-short 
invoke-* invoke-virtual, invoke-super, invoke-direct, invoke-static 
invoke-*/range invoke-virtual/range, invoke-super/range, invoke-direct/range, invoke-static/range 
 
Table 2. Possible instructions substitutions 
Instruction Possible substitutions 
add-int add-int, sub-int, mul-int, div-int, rem-int, and-int, or-int, xor-int, shl-int, shr-int, ushr-int, add-float, sub-float, mul-float, div-float, rem-float 
if-eqz if-eqz, if-nez, if-ltz, if-gez, if-gtz, if-lez 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 3. Instructions available for obfuscation 
Application name Total # instructions # instructions to obfuscate % instructions to obfuscate 
Browser 23000 14400 63% 
Contacts 33800 22100 65% 
E-Mail 99600 67700 68% 
Phone 42200 25100 59% 
Paypal 60000 38600 64% 
FXCM Mobile 34300 20900 61% 
 
4.3 Biometric generated keys 
The BossPro prototype implementation of biometric key binding (generation) is based on face biometric as illustrated in 
Figure 2. The Extended Yale B database [21], which has 38 subjects and each one in frontal pose has 64 images captured 
under different illumination conditions, is used for the experiments. The images in the database are divided into five 
subsets according to the direction of the light-source from the camera axis. Figure 6 illustrates this variation for images 
of the same person in the database. 
 
Figure 6. Images for the same person in different illumination subsets 
In the experiments, the first three images per client from subset 1 (the Yale-B database) were selected as the gallery set 
and all the remaining images were used for matching. Discrete Wavelet Transforms (DWTs) are selected as a facial 
feature extraction technique to be used efficiently on Smartphones. By selecting wavelet feature at the third level of 
decomposition, each face is represented by 504 value feature vector X, which is then converted to a binary string as 
described in [22]. By analysing the error patterns of inter- and intra-class variation of face images, it was concluded that 
38% of the binary face feature vectors need to be corrected, i.e. 191 bits out of 504 bits. In other words, if the hamming 
distance between two binary feature vectors is less than 191, then the two feature vectors belong to the same individual. 
Otherwise, the two feature vectors are considered to be from two different individuals. To cope with intra-class 
variations of face samples, Reed-Solomon (RS) error correcting code algorithm is selected (version RS(511,129,191)), 
which takes a cryptographic key of size 129 bits as an input to produce a biometric lock of size 511 bits, and corrects up 
to 191 errors. 
The experiments showed that the Equal Error Rates (EERs %) of biometric key binding is 0%, 0.9%, 1.33%, 15.48%, 
17.15% for subset1, subset2, subset3, subset4, and subset5 of the extended Yale face dataset respectively based on Reed-
Solomon ECC to retrieve a key of size 129 bits. It is worth mentioning that the 129 bit biometric key can be used as a 
seed to generate longer keys of any length based on techniques such as Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSR). 
4.4 BossPro application development and byte code obfuscation 
Android applications are written in Java, compiled with Java language compilers and then converted to Dalvik byte code 
by the Android “dx” tool. In BossPro prototype, the concept of Java Annotations is used to define which methods and/or 
complete classes should be obfuscated. Introducing the concept of “partial obfuscation” in the BossPro allows protection 
of nothing but the important parts and algorithms of an application. This will speed-up the DVM interpretation in 
applications which do not require complete code protection as the number of necessary de-obfuscation steps decreases. 
To obfuscate the byte code instructions, the Dalvik source code is de-compiled in the prototype by a disassembler. Figure 
7 shows an example of a short java method with an “Obfuscate” annotation, two integer parameters and the resultant de-
compiled Dalvik byte code. 
  
 
 
As the number of instructions available for obfuscation varies from application to application, an instruction substitution 
key with a fixed length, as produced by a standard biometric key generator, is not applicable. A pseudorandom number 
generator (PRNG) with the biometric generated key as seed is used to produce a pseudorandom bit stream of the required 
length. 
 
Figure 7. Java source code (left) and Dalvik byte code instructions (right) 
Depending on the byte code instruction and the next random bits from the PRNG output, an instruction from the same 
instruction group is selected. Figure 8 shows the obfuscation process for the two instructions “add-int” and “if-gez” (see 
Figure 7 and Table 2. First, the biometric key of the enrolled client is then extracted from the biometric key database and 
used as a seed to the PRNG. “add-int” is in step 2 the first instruction which needs to be obfuscated. The group size of 
possible substitutions for this instruction is 16 elements, i.e. requires 4 bits from the key stream. The first 4 bits from the 
stream are “0110” (or position 6 in the group, starting with 0). These bits are then used to index the substitution 
instruction “or-int”. The group of the second instruction “if-gez” contains 6 elements and therefore requires only the next 
3 bits (“010”) from the key stream; resulting in the substitution instruction “if-ltz”. After all instructions are successfully 
obfuscated, the byte code is assembled again. This "obfuscation and protected Android application file" can be then 
distributed to the client. 
 
Figure 8. Instruction obfuscation process 
 
4.5 Application execution and de-obfuscation process on the mobile device 
Upon receiving the obfuscated application from the authenticator, the client installs it on his mobile device. Once the 
client starts this protected application, the DVM on the mobile device triggers a process to capture fresh biometric 
information of the client. A biometric key and its pseudorandom bit stream are then calculated/generated in similar steps 
to the key generation process at the authenticator side (cp. section 4.4). The resultant PRNG output is then used to de-
obfuscate the application code during interpretation. Based on the next PRNG input value and the following obfuscated 
instruction read from the protected byte code, the original instruction is determined/obtained by reversing the used 
obfuscation rule (Table 2). The resultant de-obfuscated code is then ready to be executed by the DVM. 
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
5.1 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this paper proposes to combine biometric-based key generation with obfuscated interpretation to prevent 
the illegitimate execution of applications as well as to protect the software against reverse-engineering. This is 
  
 
 
particularly aimed at, but not limited to, application software installed on mobile devices with enhanced capabilities and 
sensors such as Smartphones or Tablet-PCs. BossPro can be utilised in a similar way to all kinds of software programs 
running on standard PCs. Obfuscating the program instructions with a client's specific biometric key shall tightly binds 
the genuine client to the application and hence eliminates the possibility that an attacker is able to use this protected 
application. This becomes more and more important as the use of mobile devices to perform financial/business or other 
security related transactions grows. 
The implemented prototype of BossPro based on Android Froyo shows clearly the practicality of this proposed scheme. 
That is the advantages and benefits of this tight combination of biometric authentication and software protection through 
obfuscated interpretation. The Dalvik virtual machine (which runs all system and client applications on Android based 
mobile devices) was modified to test the obfuscated interpretation in a real operating system environment. An Android 
system image with the adapted DVM was generated and used in the emulator based trials and experiments. Analyses of 
many Android build-in and market-place applications as well as the Dalvik byte code structure shows that around 60% of 
all byte code instructions can be statistically obfuscated. Also note that instructions can be replaced only with similar 
ones from the same instruction group. Otherwise the byte code verifier or optimiser would recognise the incorrect 
program and an application installation on the mobile device would not be possible. Also, the group size of similar 
instructions varies for the Android Dalvik byte code between two and sixteen elements. This results in an immense 
number of possible substitution combinations. For example, a simple method with only 20 instructions (10 instructions 
from the “add-int” and 10 from the “if-eq” group) would already result in 6.6*1019 possible combinations. The fact that 
a standard Android application has several thousand byte code instructions makes it very difficult to understand the real 
semantics of a program without having the correct de-obfuscation key. Although it would be possible for an attacker to 
start a program protected by BossPro, as the obfuscated program is still a valid application, the attacker cannot be sure 
about the program behaviour or results, or if the program terminates correctly. However, it is more likely that the 
program will crash and produce no meaningful output at all. 
Since BossPro adds with the required byte code deobfuscation process an additional step to the application interpretation 
and therefore increases the application execution time. As the methods and classes and consequently the resultant 
number of byte code instructions to be deobfuscated can be precisely specified during the application development 
process, the run-time overhead can be adjusted to the desired security level of the application. Trails on the emulator 
showed that the introduced overhead by BossPro is not noticeable for any client in an authentication application scenario. 
However, full time and CPU overhead measurements are planed when the full actual implementation has been completed 
and tested on Android mobile devices. 
5.2 Future Work 
Work on the biometric-secured obfuscation interpretation is ongoing to further analyse and enhance the security of 
BossPro. As a first step, the authors will extent the prototype and implement all possible instruction substitutions in the 
obfuscation process as well as inside the Dalvik virtual machine. Furthermore, real-world experiments and trials on 
Android mobile devices will be carried out, which requires installation of the adapted Android operating system on real 
hardware. The authors will also investigate, how the integration of present location and real-time into the key generation 
and obfuscation process can further eliminate various possibilities of application misuse, i.e. by employing the current 
location of the mobile device determined by the GPS receiver into the obfuscation algorithms. This shall eliminate 
various types of "distance attacks" which are a main threat to mobile devices and mobile based applications. 
To further verify and increase the security of BossPro, the results of various de-compilation and reverse-engineering 
tools for Java and Dalvik byte code, e.g. “undx” or “Dex2Jar” on the biometric-secured obfuscation applications will be 
analysed. However, first reverse-engineering experiments clearly showed that these programs are not able to restore the 
original semantics of the obfuscated applications. Finally, the combination of biometric-secured obfuscated interpretation 
with other software protection techniques, e.g. control flow obfuscation [23] or opaque constructs [24], will be 
investigated. It is expected, that these techniques can be easily used together and that a combination will not negatively 
affect the obfuscated interpretation. In contrast, they should further enhance the security of BossPro as they build a first 
line of defence against attacks and even increase in some cases the number of instructions which then can be obfuscated. 
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